Summary of Incident. “On 8 July 1950, Col Robert R Martin (redacted, but deduced from other records), Infantry, was killed in action in

Chonan, Korea. He was the (34th Infantry) Regimental Commander and was leading a subordinate battalion of his unit in an effort to repel a severe attack by tanks and infantry against his positions. While endeavoring to single-handedly knock out a tank with a bazooka at a range of 15 yards, he was killed instantly by a tank projectile which struck him squarely in the body at close range.”

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 300-1 is a telegram addressed to Zakharov and signed by Shtykov (Soviet Ambassador to North Korea). This document is a progress report on the Korean War as of 24 July 1950. Most of the document is about the success the North Korean People’s Army is having against the US Army’s 34th Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division-lists of equipment captured, POW numbers, etc. This document states, “ The 34th Regiment of the 24th American Division was routed during the battles for the town of Tajden. 108 soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, among these was Commander of the American 34th Regiment.”
U.S.   According to CILHI and other sources, there were four separate commanders of the 34th IR prior to 24 July 1950. They were and their tenure as Commanding Officer are:

COL Jay B. Lovless 25 June - 7 July 1950 Relieved and returned to Japan

Col Robert R Martin (redacted, but recreated) 7 - 8 July 1950 Killed in action

LTC Robert Wadlington. 8 - 18 July 1950 Temporary Commanding Officer Never captured

COL Charles Beauchamp 18 July 1950 - 1951 Departed Korea approx. April 1951 for Tokyo

Of the four possible candidates above, Martin is the only Commander who was at the appropriate place and time. He is currently listed on the CILHI list as KIA/BNR based on the eyewitness account of his being struck at point blank range by a tank projectile. Although his remains were not recovered, his death was never in question prior to receipt of this Russian report.

Current Status

It is possible that did not die as reported and was captured. In the heat of battle, the eyewitness account could be in error. It is equally possible that the Russian report is in error and that the officer reported captured was not the Commanding Officer, but one of the staff officers for the regiment. This case has been presented to the Russian side of the Commission. The Russians maintain that their report must be in error, however, no additional information has been provided to

substantiate either possibility.

RB-45  4 December 1950

Summary of Incident. On 4 December 1950 around noon time, John Raymond Lovell 924A and ___________ AO-16783 took off in a RB-45 from Yokota Air Base, Japan. Since Lovell was not a regular member of the aircraft crew, but was rather a senior Air Force intelligence officer assigned to the Pentagon and on TDY in the Far East, __________served as an observer on this mission. At approximately 1250 hours, the RB-45 was intercepted by a flight of MiG-15 fighters and was shot down 70 km east of Andung. At least one person managed to parachute from the aircraft.32

Charles Edward McDonough AO-794558, pilot

Jules Edwin Young AO-800628, co-pilot

James Jerome Picucci AO-928027, navigator

Archival Records

Russian. name does not appear on any of the lists of names provided to the

U.S. side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission.

TFR 242: This is a set of two documents. Originally the Russians provided the U.S. side of the Commission with one document that was in reality a sanitized, pasted together version of the two. A contractor working for the Defense POW/MIA Office, however, was able to provide the U.S. side of

the Commission copies of the two original documents. The first document is a message dated 17 December 1950. It is from General Belov, who was

then the commander of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps, to Generals Shtemenko and Batitskii.33

The purpose of the message was to inform the senior Soviet leadership that for the first time an RB-45 had been shot down. At the time, the RB-45 was seen as the “hottest”, light bomber in theAmerican inventory and General Belov was clearly pleased to inform Moscow of his unit’s success. In the message, Belov reported, “An aircraft shot down on 12-4-50 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km east of Andun. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to earth burned up completely.

The crew bailed out in parachutes [emphasis added]. The pilot was taken prisoner...The crew numbering 3 persons bailed out in parachutes. The

navigator having landed ran off, where the radio operator disappeared to . . .  he did not see. The captive himself was burned and is in critical  condition.” It is clear from this message that the Soviets did not know there were four and not three people on the RB-45. The next day, General Stepan Akimovich Krasovskii, then a senior Soviet advisor to the North Koreans, sent a cryptic message to Moscow, “I report that the pilot from the shot down RB-45 died on route and the interrogation was not completed.”34

TFR 76-31: This is the transcript of interrogation. According to a note at the

bottom of the document, a Major Kuznetsov prepared the questions. It is not clear who conducted the interrogation, but a Chinese official translated the original English text into Russian.35 During the interrogation, stated that the RB-45 ‘has a crew of three - a pilot, navigator, and radio operator.” Later recounted, “The plane caught fire and all three (emphasis added) crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don’t know where the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed.” It is important to note that did not mention during the interrogation that his RB-45 was carrying a fourth crew member - . Indeed, a close reading of the transcript strongly suggests that was deliberately trying to conceal from his captors the fact there was a fourth man aboard the aircraft.

U.S. A document titled “Air Force Personnel Reported to Have Died in POW-Camp, Been, Very Ill in POW Camp or Killed in Crash...” simply states “ told another POW he was only survivor. Believed was dead.”36

21 September 1955: In a letter to a Mr. Joseph P. Nagoski, U.S. Department of State from LTC Richard A. Steele, USAF, Chief, Casualty Branch, Personnel Services Division, Directorate of Military Personnel, Headquarters USAF, LTC Steele provides the following details of the shoot down on the RB-45 carrying . “... furnished the following details concerning

his missing status to Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, Jr.37 indicated that while flying a B-45 (sic) along the Yalu River, the aircraft was attacked by five MiGs and two engines were shot out. He stated that he was the only one who escaped from the aircraft (emphasis added), having managed to get the canopy off and bail out at an altitude of about 1,000 feet. landed in the burning wreckage and was severely burned about the hands and face. After evading capture, for 3 or 4 days without shoes, he turned himself in to the North Koreans...he was placed in a cell with Captain Shawe in Sinuiji, North Korea. Two days later they were removed from the cell and Captain Shawe joined a group of prisoners starting a march to another prison camp. could not walk and was carried to an ox cart by fellow prisoners. The North Koreans said he was being taken to a hospital for medical treatment, because he was suffering from frostbite and gangrene of both legs. He was not seen again by repatriates after 16 December 1950, and they reported his condition was so bad at that time that he was not expected to survive.”

Propaganda Broadcast - On 21 May 1951 U.S. listening stations intercepted an enemy (no further information) propaganda broadcast “in which a Lieutenant Colonel Lorel, United States Air Force, was mentioned as being captured in northern Korea. The spelling of the name could not be

verified, was believed to be phonetic, and resembled none of the names of Air Force personnel missing in Korea, with the exception of ____________.”38

Personal Accounts

Colonel Aleksandr Fedorovich Andrianov - He was the pilot who shot down the RB-45 that carried .39 He was first interviewed by a Department of Defense contractor and later by the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs at the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow.

During the first interview, Colonel Andrianov described in detail the shootdown, “When I fired the first time, it was still too far. And then the distance was about 600 to 800 meters. I started firing.  And here I saw that something fell from him...And during the second approach, he (the RB-45) burst into flames. And here he started to descend and only the pilot (emphasis added) jumped out of the aircraft. The crew was supposed to be three or four people, I don’t remember exactly now. We probably got them when we were firing. The plane hit the hill before our eyes. An explosion. We kept circling above. The pilot landed with his parachute. He was picked up by a special team, the Korean team would pick up all the pilots who were shot down, including ours. And he went to prison.”

In April 1995, Colonel Andrianov expanded up his earlier testimony, “At approximately 3,000 meters or lower, I saw one parachute deploy from the aircraft. All of my colleagues saw only one parachute as well. None of us saw any other parachutes [emphasis added]. Although I have heard that others jumped, we did not note any other parachutes....However, I clearly saw the aircraft crash and explode.”

Although Colonel Andrianov was not present, he was able to describe during the first interview how the pilot of the RB-45 ultimately died based on what a friend Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov told him. Fironov was a lieutenant colonel at the time and the regimental political officer. It was Fironov who interrogated the American pilot. “He (the pilot) was kind of arrogant”, according to Andrianov. “...(T)he Koreans executed him the same way. They got a piece of plywood. They wrote down all he

said on that plywood -- ‘I am an American pilot. This is my third surveillance flight. According to my data such and such towns and plants were destroyed, such and such number of older people and children were killed’. And with it they let him go to Singisyu. They gave him a one man escort. That  patrolman was given specific instructions not to interfere too much. First, he walked as if through a
38 AFPMP-12-E 704 Missing (4 Dec 50) SR&D Case #80

39 Colonel Andrianov was born in 1919 and is a veteran of both the Second World War and the Korean War.

formation. People were on both sides. First, they only shouted at him, cursed him, threw sticks. The

patrolman did not interfere too much. Then, they started to spit at him, hit him...he was finished.”

Colonel Pavel Vasilyevich Fironov - In early 1995, Colonel Fironov was interviewed in

Moscow by an investigator from the Joint Commission. This was for Fironov at least his second

interview. Not long before, he was interviewed by Igor Morozov, a Russian journalist working for the

BBC. Apparently during this interview, Fironov was given background information on the shootdown

of the RB-45 and in particular information on the crew members. As a result, Fironov’s testimony to

the Joint Commission can be considered at potentially influenced or “tainted”.

BBC Interview - In March 1996, the BBC television network aired on Time Watch a special

report titled “Stalin’s Secret War”. One segment of this program discussed the case of

. Colonel Fironov was introduced as the man who interrogated . Then

for several moments Fironov was interviewed in Russian with an English voice over. Portions of the

interview were edited out and replaced with the narrator’s summary of what Fironov said.

Fironov describes his initial meeting with , the fact that he had a fact book on the

Soviet Air Force (described by the narrator as a “highly classified document”), and the anger of the

North Korean general, who was also present for the interrogation, over perceived arrogance.

Then switching to a photograph of , the narrator says, “The North Korean

general angered by belligerence had him marched to the local town, a placard with

the words “War Criminal” hung around his neck. was beaten to death by the local

people.”

The program does not indicate how Fironov knew that the person he interrogated was

and not or another airman. However, when an investigator from the Joint

Commission interviewed Fironov a few months after his interview by the BBC, it seemed that Fironov’s

identification of is less certain.

During the interview with the Joint Commission investigator, Fironov recounted that the man

identified himself as “the commander of that crew, although he himself told me that he was a regimental

commander.” When asked if this man was , Fironov replied, “Yes, yes, yes.” Then when

76

asked, “And how is that you heard his name?”, Fironov said, “Who? The regimental commander?

Morozov’s (the Russian journalist who first interviewed Fironov) daughter told me this.”

Later, during the April 1995 Working Group Talks in Moscow, Colonel Fironov was

interviewed by members of the Joint Commission. When asked to describe the man he interrogated,

Colonel Fironov said, “I would say (he was) about 32 - no more than 32 years of age”. Asked if the

man he met wore glasses, Fironov replied, “No”. Finally when requested to describe his prisoner,

Fironov said, “About like me. Regarding his physical characteristics, he was similar to me”. Colonel

Fironov is of slender build and about 5’ 7” tall while was 5’ 6” inches tall and stout at 183

lbs. was also forty-six years of age and wore glasses. , however, was

31 years of age, tall, and slender at 6’ 2” and 195 lbs. He did not wear glasses.

It should also be noted that during Colonel Fironov’s first interview with an investigator from

the Joint Commission, Fironov was asked, “Tell me, did you hear what happened to him, this person

with whom you talked?”

Fironov replied, “No, how would I know?”

Investigator, “You didn’t hear that they killed him, or that he died?”

“No, no”, Fironov responded.

A similar line of questioning was raised with Fironov at the April 1995 Working Group Talks by

a Joint Commission staffer who asked, “When he (the RB-45 crewman) asked you to spare his life,

was it within your power to do so?”

“We had no relationship whatsoever with the prisoner,” Colonel Fironov answered. “Don’t you

understand that all we did was conducted a discussion with him regarding aircraft? We had no other

relationship regarding the prisoner.”

Colonel Firnov in his two interviews with members of the Joint Commission apparently sought

to distance himself from his earlier testimony that the American flyer he interrogated was killed by an

irate crowd of North Korean civilians.

Current Status.

77

There is a high probability that died in the crash of the RB-45 on which

he flew. Furthermore, it is argued that the American flyer interrogated by Colonel Fironov was

, the pilot of the RB-45, and not .

First, this assessment is based on an evaluation of Colonel Fironov’s description of the man he

interrogated. Fironov’s description more closely fits that of than it does of

. Second, Colonel Fironov inadvertently seems to have been influenced by a statement from a Russian

journalist’s daughter suggesting he had interrogated a . Third, an American airman who

occupied a cell with a man who identified himself at

strongly suggests that it was indeed who survived the crash and not

. Fourth, this American airman, Lieutenant Shawe said that told him that only

he ( ) survived the crash of the aircraft. The fact that told his captors that

the entire three man crew managed to bail out can be attributed to a conscious effort on

part to deceive his North Korean/Chinese captors. A further indication of this deceptiveness is the fact

that told his captors that there were only three men on the RB-45 and not four! Fifth,

the fact that Colonel Andrianov, the man who shot down the RB-45, saw only one parachute supports

the assessment that only one crew member bailed out. Sixth, the contemporary Russian documentary

record shows that a was interrogated. There is no mention in the Russian

documents available to the U.S. side of the Commission suggesting that a colonel was captured on or

about 4 December 1950. Had an American colonel been captured, especially one with an intelligence

background, the senior Soviet leadership would have certainly been informed immediately.

Colonel Fironov’s statement that the flyer he interrogated was killed by an angry North Korean

crowd can not be verified although it is plausible. Fironov’s veracity on this point is weakened by his

apparent effort to back away from supporting this statement.

Although the U.S. side of the Commission firmly believes that there is a high probability that

died in the crash of the RB-45 and was not captured, the Commission will continue to seek additional

information that will clear up any ambiguity surrounding this case.

Summary of Incident. PVT Lawson, a Marine Corps Reservist , was called to active duty on

27 July 1950 to serve in the Ground Forces in North Korea. On or about 5 December 1950, after

telling a fellow Marine he thought his feet were frostbitten, PVT Lawson began to walk to an aid station

near the town of Hagaru-ri. He was never seen or heard from again. PVT Lawson was declared MIA.

Background. On 22 June 1991, 60 Minutes aired a program called The Last Gulag: Perm 35.

This program was narrated by Mike Wallace of CBS News and the film footage of the Russian prison

camp was shot by the French. While watching this program, thirteen of Milton Lawson’s friends and

relatives identified one of the inmates as Lawson.

Archival Records

None

Personal Accounts

In September 1992, a member of Task Force Russia met with a former Perm 35 inmate “who

easily identified a reputed MIA photo of PVT Lawson as a friend and former inmate named Vladimir

Shchebol.”

On 5 June 1995, Task Force Russia interviewed Vladimir Iosifovich Shchebol. He confirmed

that journalists had been to Perm 35 and had taken pictures and films of several inmates. He stated that

he had been born in Belarus and did not even have any knowledge of Lawson. During the interview,

Task Force Russia took photographs of Shchebol.

Current Status

Based on an analysis of the photographs of Shchebol and Lawson and the testimony of

Shchebol himself, it is highly probable that the man identified as Lawson on the 60 Minutes program

was in fact Vladimir Shchebol. Other than the alleged association of PVT Lawson with a Russian

prison camp by friends and family, there is no Russian activity regarding this case.

Summary of Incident. 5 April 1951, a B-26 piloted by CPT Unruh departed Taegu Air Base

for a night intruder mission in the Pyongyang area. Shortly after take off, a routine report was received

from LT (rank at time) Unruh indicating that there were no difficulties and they were proceeding on

course to target area. No further contact was made. The fate of the crew and aircraft is unknown.

UNRUH, Halbert, CPT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. CPT Unruh’s name appears on the list of 71 more formally known as List of

U. S. Air Force Crew Members Participating in Combat Operations in North Korea 1950-53, and

About Whom Information Has Been Found in Documents of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps. This list

was compiled by the Russians and given to the U.S. side in 1992. Number 67 on this list states,

“Ul’RIKh KhOL’BERT-perished in crash.”

TFR 76-25: The Russian side of the USRJC has provided an additional document which

mentions the fate of CPT Unruh. TFR 76 -25 is a cover sheet which states, “I am submitting to you a

translation of the document taken from the dead American flier ULL’RIKH KHAL’BERT, shot down

by AAA on 4 April 1951 near KHAKUSEN...” Unfortunately, the attached document lists the

personal effects belonging to vice CPT Unruh. Regardless of the mix up, the cover letter

states that the personal effects of CPT Unruh were retrieved. According to the Russians, in several

cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents (i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at

the crash site were gathered and sent through an interrogation point for processing. There is little reason

to doubt this statement as it is common practice in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well.

U.S. CPT Unruh’s name appears in the 77 page document formally titled The Transfer of

United States Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union. This document is actually a collection of studies

and hypotheses compiled by the U. S. side to use as a working tool. CPT Unruh’s name appears in this

122

document as part of a study conducted by TSGT Siedling on Korean War POWs on whom the Russian

archives may contain information.

Current Status

Despite the obvious “mix up” of the /Unruh files, there is little reason to doubt the

veracity of the Russian documents. The Russian side has complied with our request to try to locate the

“correct” documents belonging to CPT Unruh. Both sides of the USRJC agree that there is a high

probability that CPT Unruh perished.

Summary of Incident. On 12 April 1951, a flight of B-29s departed Kadena Air Base for a

combat mission over North Korea. The flight was attacked by a number of enemy aircraft. Moments

later SGT Bergmann’s B-29 was observed leaving the formation with one engine and left wing in flames

and shortly afterwards spiraling downward out of control. The aircraft exploded upon impact with the

side of a mountain.

                             MIA             SGT Bevans, Robert  MIA

                             MIA             SGT Bergmann, Louis MIA

1LT Aaron, George KIA                                              MIA

                             poss. KIA      SGT Gant, John       RMC

2LT Bullock, Elmer KIA               SGT Millward, George RMC

MSG Jones, Robert KIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 76-8 to 76-14: The Russian side of the Commission presented to the U.S. side

a document entitled “Brief Biographical Data on Prisoners”. Under the heading “Prisoners from B-29

Millward and SGT Bergmann is summarized. With the exception of SGT Bergmann, all POWs

mentioned in this section of the Russian document were subsequently repatriated.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

Personal Accounts

A report received from the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, dated 15 October

1951, revealed that a Korean Military Observer allegedly received word that five persons were seen

parachuting from the disabled plane before it crashed. He further related that of the five, four had been

captured by the enemy forces and that a search was in progress for the fifth.

Statements from former POWs and witnesses confirm that three of the eleven individuals from

the B-29 survived the crash and were captured. SGT Gant, SGT Millward, and SGT Bergmann were

held prisoner in the same camp. SGT Gant and SGT Millward were repatriated during Operation Big

Switch. Both Gant and Millward saw SGT Bergmann alive in the camp. In fact, SGT Gant shared a

cell with SGT Bergmann. Repatriated POWs from other crews as well recall meeting SGT Bergmann

while in captivity. He was seen alive several times between September and November 1951. At one

point during his imprisonment, SGT Bergmann apparently became ill with amebic dysentery and he was

taken to a hospital to be treated by a Hungarian medical team. Whether or not he returned alive from

the hospital is unknown. It can, however, be said with certainty that SGT Bergmann was seen alive in a

POW camp after the crash of the aircraft.

Current Status

Both Russian and U.S. sources confirm that SGT Bergmann survived the crash, was in a POW

camp and was interrogated. SGT Bergmann did not return to United States military control after the

war. The U.S. side has requested that the Russians provide additional information on SGT Bergmann.

To date, no additional information has been provided. The ultimate fate of SGT Bergmann remains

unknown.

Repatriated crew members reported that there were only three survivors. JCSD believes that

there is a high probability that the “unaccounted for” (MIA) crew members, ,

, and , perished in the crash.

Additional Information. According to documentation and statements of repatriated POWs, of

the eleven B-29 crew members, two were captured and returned, one was captured and not returned

and eight did not survive the crash. Additional information has since been found regarding four of the

deceased crew members. On 8 December 1993, The United States Army Central Identification

Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) received a shipment of 31 skeletal remains from the Korean War. These

remains were recovered by the North Korean Government and turned over to the U.N. Command.

Remains were then taken to CILHI for processing. In 1994 the remains of the following individuals

from the B-29 crew were identified by CILHI:

1. 1LT Aaron, George

2. 2LT Bullock, Elmer

3. MSG Jones, Robert

The identification of the remains believed to be those of _______________ is pending.

B-29    7 May 1951

Summary of Incident. On 7 May 1951, this B-29 departed Yokota Air Base for a bombing

mission in the Pyongyang area of North Korea. After arriving in the target area, the plane was severely

damaged by enemy flak causing a fire in the right wing and two engines. The aircraft commander

radioed that they would have to crash land and were heading for friendly territory. Shortly thereafter,

another radio report was received indicating that the fire could not be controlled and that the crew

would have to leave the disabled aircraft. The parachutes of four unidentified crew members were then

seen leaving the plane before it crashed to the ground southwest of Pyongyang. An extensive aerial

search was initiated by Air Rescue units and the wreckage of the burning aircraft was sighted, but all

efforts to locate the crew members were to no avail.

Unaccounted for:

Adler, Junior Merle

Bacon, Raymond Randolph MIA

Black, Vance Eugene MIA

Chapman, Dewey Lyle MIA

Chesnowsky, Frank Joseph MIA

Collins, John Soulard MIA

Erickson, Lee Eldon MIA

Hawes, Richard Elliot MIA

Rice, John Andrew MIA

Stoll, Edward Joseph MIA

(the above names were redacted, but recreated from other sources)

Accounted for:

McTAGGART, William C., CPT RMC

JONES, Richard M., S/SGT RMC

SMITH, Ellsworth E, S/SGT RMC

Archival Records

Russian. The alleged Pravda article. JCSD is trying to obtain a copy.

U.S. The Individual Deceased Personnel File (293 file) of _____________contains several

documents entitled “Returnee Report on Death of an Individual in a Captured Status”. According to

repatriated POWs who witnessed his death, _________ died of dysentery and malnutrition while in a North Korean POW Camp and was interred in November 1951.

Personal Accounts

In August 1992, JCSD members interviewed Colonel Gavril Korotkov, a retired senior Soviet

intelligence officer. Colonel Korotkov stated that he personally interrogated two American POWs.

Korotkov could not recall the names of any of the American POWs who were processed through

Colonel Aleksandr Semenovich Orlov, a retired Soviet intelligence officer and current

Commissioner on the Russian side of the Joint Commission, met with ____________ in North Korea in June 1951 and set up an interview between ________ and a local Pravda correspondent.

According to Colonel Orlov, the article appeared in the summer of 1951. JCSD has not seen a copy of

this article.

Current Status

According to U.S. Air Force records, ______________ died of dysentery and malnutrition in

November 1951, six months after his capture. The Russian side of the Commission has been forthright

with the fact that the Russians interviewed _________ while he was a POW.

Summary of Incident. According to USAF records, on 13 September 1952 a B-29 (number 44-86343) was “flying over target where it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen exploding in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue (team conducted) searches for seven days with

negative results. No chance of survival”. One of the 12 crew members, A1C Fred Parker, was captured and subsequently repatriated during “Operation Big Switch”. The remaining 11 members of the crew are listed as MIA/BNR on the CILHI data base.

ROYER, Ted, LT MIA                 Lebaron, James Robert MIA 

BROWN, Nelson Marion MIA      Peters, Spiro Joseph MIA

Hobday, Jimmie Rowland MIA  Kelly, Henry Bradford MIA

BLOESCH, Fred, LT MIA           Phillis, William Kay MIA

LOWE, James, CPT MIA            Trosclair, James Oliver MIA

Kelly, James William MIA         PARKER, Fred Jr., A1C RMC
(most of the above were redacted, but recreated from other sources)

Archival Records

29s at altitudes ranging from 6800m to 7500m. Two B-29s were shot down and two B-29s were

damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 corpses were found...The search continues.”

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

26

Current Status

Evidence suggests that the Soviet records are describing the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343

with the above mentioned crew. The Russian side of the Commission has been asked to account for the

disposition of the five corpses and provide any identification found at the crash site as well as

Summary of Incident. was one of the 14 member crew of a B-29 shot

down on 12 January 1953. The aircraft was engaged by an estimated 12 aircraft approximately 20

miles east of Uiju before it disappeared from the radar scope. According to U. S. records, “On 22

January 1953, Peking radio reported that all but three of the crew had been captured, those three

having been killed. Only Colonel Arnold and Captain Vaadi...were mentioned as having been

captured.”

Unaccounted for:

MIA

MIA

MIA

Accounted for:

ARNOLD, John K. COL RMC

BENJAMIN, Harry, A1C RMC

BAUMER, William, MAJ RMC

BROWN, Howard, TSG RMC

BROWN, Wallace, LT RMC

BUCK, John W., LT RMC

KIBA, Steve E, A1C RMC

LLEWELLYN, Elmer, CPT RMC

SCHMIDT, Daniel, A2C RMC

THOMPSON, John W. RMC

57

VAADI, Eugene CPT RMC

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 37-23: A high level correspondence states, “according to the report from MGB

USSR advisor in China, 9 crew members of an aircraft from the 91st Reconnaissance Detachment,

American Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the area of An’dun on 12 January 53, were taken

prisoner. The chief of communication services and supply, Colonel EHNNOT (Arnold) and staff officer

of operational reconnaissance service Major BAUL (Baumer) were also on the aircraft...” The eleven

crew members (nine plus Arnold and Baumer) that were mentioned as having been captured were

confirmed as POWs and subsequently repatriated.

The Russian side has provided to the U.S. side 30 sets of documents containing information on

POWs. Some of the documents are full interrogation reports while others are summaries or lists.

Nevertheless, the entire batch of documents is referred to as the “interrogation reports”. This document

is entitled “Register of POWs”. It lists brief biographical data on the eleven members of the crew who

were captured. The end comment on the document confirms that the remaining three crew members,

, , and , were reported as having been killed in the crash.

U.S. USAF records as mentioned above in summary.

Current Status

is mentioned in three independent sources as having perished in the crash - U.S.

reports, Peking reports and Soviet reports. Unless there are adequate grounds or subsequent

information that challenges the veracity of these reports, the evidence implies that

perished in the crash.

Summary of Incident. On 12 April 1953, LT de Luna took off on a single aircraft night

interdiction combat mission at 1951 hours. His F-84 was reported over target area YD 2488. His

radar blip was lost from the scope at 2042 hours. Another aircraft in the target area observed two

bomb blasts followed by a third larger explosion approximately 40 minutes later.

DE LUNA, Leonard, LT MIA

Archival Records

Bikhen region at 500m altitude, engaged four F-84s. One pilot, Captain Semenov, fired and shot down

one F-84 at a distance of 800 m on the target’s rear aspect.”

U.S. According to USAF records, two F-84s were lost on 12 April 1953. The one above

piloted by LT de Luna and the other piloted by . Both these individuals are listed as

Current Status

Russian Operational Summary Number 102 most likely refers to one of these two incidents.

Unfortunately, the report does not contain enough details to narrow it down to one. Moreover, the

Russian report does not state the fate of the pilot of the shot down F-84. In any case, the loss of at

least one F-84 on 12 April 1953 is confirmed by this Russian document. The possibility exists that this

may have been LT Leonard de Luna’s aircraft.

However, based on the documents available to the U.S. , it is our assessment that the Russian data is

inconclusive.

Summary of Incident. On 3 May 1953 LT Harker was flying in an F-84 “on a night intruder

mission. At approximately 2105 hours, he made his last radio contact. Shortly after his last call, LT

Harker faded from the radar scope. The area was searched but no wreckage could be established.”

Personnel Involved.

HARKER, Charles, LT MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 16: LT Harker’s name appears on a list of 59 names compiled by the Russians

entitled List of United States Air Force Personnel, Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft

Artillery During Military Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point. Of the 59

names, two are duplicates and one is a non-American. The majority of the 56 U.S. servicemen on this

list have been repatriated. LT Harker is one of the five from this list who is still “unaccounted for”. The

Russians subsequently provided the U.S. side with the documents that the list of 59 was based upon.

They have referred to these documents as interrogation reports. However, in some cases, the

“interrogation” document was not an interrogation report per se, but a list of personal effects. The

Russian explanation for this is that in several cases where the pilot perished, those personal documents

(i.e. ID card, ration card etc.) found intact at the crash site were gathered and sent through an

interrogation point for processing. There is little reason to doubt this statement as it is common practice

in the U.S. and NATO militaries as well. Entry #48 on the list states, “4 May 1953...2LT Charles A.

Harker.”

TFR 76-33: This document is entitled “ Inventory of Documents from 2LT Charles A. Harker

Aerial Combat with a MiG 15 4 May 1953.” This is a one page document listing the personal effects of

LT Harker such as ID card, ration card, red cross card, driver’s license, etc. Unfortunately, there is no

mention as to the disposition of the pilot or his remains.

U.S. USAF records as stated above in summary.

55

Current Status

The Russian side of the Commission maintains that LT Harker perished in the crash and that

only his personal effects transited an interrogation point. There is insufficient evidence on which to base

any conclusions. The Russian side has been asked to provide any information regarding this incident.

To date, there has been no additional information.

Summary of Incident. On 20 July 1953 was on a mission to attack the Yang Ni

Dong bridge complex at Sinanju. Another pilot on the same flight stated, “I observed

F-86 receive a direct hit by AA and explode. I observed the right wing of the aircraft fall

away engulfed in flame and other smaller pieces of the aircraft falling around a large mass that appeared

to be the fuselage...I observed what appeared to be the fuselage hit the north bank of the river but

observed no parachute.” The serial number of F-86 was 52-4469 and it crashed at YD

241890.

MIA

Archival Records

Russian. TFR 323: The following information was found in a report written by a Russian search

and rescue team from Field Post No. 77970. “On 19 July 1953, we received an assignment to conduct

a search for an aircraft shot down by AA on 19 July 1953. We learned from the local inhabitants that

at approximately 1900 hours (Korean time) an enemy aircraft engulfed in flames appeared from a

northerly direction at low altitude and fell into the river 40-50 meters from the shore. When we arrived

at the sight, we saw the aircraft. The nose section had sunk and approximately one and a half meters of

the tail section was above the water. We swam up to the plane and saw that it was an F-86. On the

tail section in big black numbers was written No. 24629.”

U.S. The aircraft with the exact number mentioned in the Russian document 24629 (52-4629)

belonged to an aircraft that was operational until September 1955-over two years after the Korean

War. The following is a list of all the F-86 serial numbers that were lost in July 1953:

F-86E 51-2756 F-86E 51-2824

F-86E 52-2836 F-86F 52-4368

F-86F 52-4469 F-86F 52-4491

117

Although none of the numbers match exactly, only one serial number has all the elements of the

one mentioned in the Russian document. This information has been recorded from English on the burnt

aircraft, to Korean and finally to Russian. It was common practice not to display the first number of the

production year on the tail. The actual number displayed would have been No. 24469. Therefore, the

numbers mentioned in both documents only differ by one numeral. It is highly likely that this number

was mistakenly recorded in the Russian document.

Furthermore, the pilot of the F-86 with the s/n 52-4469 was . The circumstances

in both the U.S. account and the Russian account of the shoot down of are almost identical. A

sketch of the crash site accompanied the Russian document. The location of the crash was the same in

both the U.S. and Russian versions.

Current Status

The similarities outweigh the few discrepancies that exist between the two documents. It has

been our experience in the past that dates, times and serial numbers may be off by a small margin.

Hence, based on the comparison of the two documents, we believe there is significant evidence that the

aircraft found by the Russians was piloted by . There was, unfortunately, no

mention as to the disposition of the pilot in the Russian document.

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has collected a significant amount

of information that suggests that there is a high probability that during the Korean War American POWs

were transferred from Korea to the Soviet Union.

While information in support of this assessment that Americans were transferred is incomplete

and sometimes ambiguous, it is, nevertheless, highly suggestive. Indeed, when viewed in a broad

context, one can see a consistent pattern of events such that there is a high probability that some

transfers took place.

The notion that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union was articulated in a preliminary

1993 study produced by the Defense POW/MIA Office and titled The Transfer of U.S. Korean War

The primary goal of the report was to show the Russians that a body of information exists

suggesting that the Soviets had taken American POWs to the Soviet Union. The U.S. believed that

once confronted with the evidence, albeit circumstantial, the Russians could no longer lightly dismiss

American suggestions that the transfers took place.

The report succeeded in this goal. The Russians publicly went on record stating that the

possibility of the transfer of American POWs could not be dismissed. The Russians did not confirm

such transfers, but they did move away from an adamant denial of the possibility.

The 1993 Transfer report tied together disparate sources to suggest initially that hundreds, if not

thousands, of POWs could have been taken to the USSR. The report reviewed numerous sources of

information. It was, however, a tentative report because time prohibited a close and careful assessment

of all the data then available. Over the past three years, U.S. analysts have analyzed the data collected,

compared it with other, newer data, and refined its analysis. In the last several years, the information in

support of the transfer question has grown stronger. However, the data does not support the notion

that “hundreds” of Americans were transferred to the Soviet Union. Rather it suggests that perhaps only

thirty to forty were transferred. The evidence in support of this conclusion is detailed later in this report.

Soviet Recollections

Information suggesting that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union can be divided into

three categories. The first is recollections of former Soviet officers, soldiers, and citizens who played a

role in the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. As a group, these individuals are the most

persuasive sources. Although the recollections of some have been clouded by the passage of years,

their fundamental thrust and outline remains consistent. Especially impressive is the fact that these men

did not know one another. Yet, they have independently come forward of their own volition to offer

their unique piece of the story. It should be noted that these sources are people who held respected

and responsible positions in the Soviet military and civil society.

Since the original publication of The Transfer report, U.S. analysts have interviewed additional

figures, re-interviewed others, and analyzed still more documents. The most striking development since

the publication of “The Transfer” is that there is now testimony by the former commander of Soviet

forces in Korea (as recounted in the notes of an interviewing Russian journalist) that American POWs

were sent to the Soviet Union. Perhaps even more compelling is the testimony of a former Soviet

sergeant who claims he saw American POWs in a hospital in the Soviet Far East.

General Georgi Lobov, the senior Soviet commander in Korea, not long before his death

recounted to a Russian journalist that he knew that at least thirty to forty American POWs were sent to

the Soviet Union (see Appendix on General Lieutenant Georgi Ageyevich Lobov for additional details).

Sergeant Vladimir Trotsenko, a former Soviet NCO, was in 1951 in a hospital in the Soviet Far

East. His hospital bed was placed outside a room that held four injured American flyers. The details of

Trotsenko’s testimony are compelling and point to the presence of American servicemen within the

borders of the Soviet Union (see Appendix on Sergeant Vladimir Trotsenko for additional details).

The testimony of these two men is buttressed by the recollections of two retired Soviet colonels.

Colonel Pavel Derzskii recounted that there was a standing order to send all captured pilots to the

Soviet Union. He also claims that in response to orders from his superiors, he had an assistant arrange

the transfer of a captured American/British intelligence agent, an American pilot, and an American

general to the Soviet Union (see Appendix on Colonel Pavel Derzskii for additional details).

Yet, another retired colonel, Gavril I. Korotkov, recounted how he interrogated American

POWs on the territory of the Soviet Union. Moreover, he described how the MGB would have

handled American POWs both during the transfer phase and later when they were being interrogated in

Pavel Umnyashkin, an aircraft mechanic in Andung during the Korean War, claims that a

captured American pilot spoke before an assembly of Soviet servicemen. The American serviceman

supposedly said, “I no longer believe that the Soviets are the beasts they have been portrayed to be.”

The American was then, according to Umnyashkin, flown to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Nikolay Belyakov told a Commission investigator that an American pilot was captured

when his F-86 was forced down. The American was sent to Moscow, according to Belyakov,

“because Stalin wanted to speak with him”. Moreover, Colonel Ivan Kozhedub, a Soviet regimental

commander at the time, interrogated the American who told the colonel “he wanted to go to Moscow.”

In another case, Nikolai Kazersky, a former gulag inmate and decorated Soviet soldier, told of

meeting an American flyer in the gulag during the Korean War (see Appendix on Nikolai Kazerskii for

additional details).

A former Chinese officer Shu Ping Wa (also spelled Ping Hwa Xu) recounted that in 1951 he

turned over three captured American flyers to Soviet officers. As befitting a bureaucracy, the Russians

provided the Chinese with “hand receipts” for the American flyers.

Yurii Klimovich, a design engineer at the Sukhoi Design Bureau, recounted that a senior

colleague told him that a captured American F-86 pilot lectured Soviet design engineers on the

appearance before the Joint Commission, he would not venture beyond hearsay testimony.

142

capabilities and handling characteristics of an F-86. The pilot was allegedly held in the Lubyanka prison

and was occasionally driven to the design works for technical discussions with the engineers.

Valentin Konstantinovich Pak, although he did not have direct contact with American POWs,

was a highly placed official in the North Korean government. He became First Deputy Foreign Minister

of the newly independent North Korea although he was technically a Soviet citizen. Valentin Pak

recounted to U.S. investigators that during the Korean War a Chinese foreign service officer named Lu

told him that American POWs were sent to the Soviet Union via China during the Korean War.

U.S. Intelligence Reports

U.S. intelligence reports constitute the second type of information. Throughout the Korean War

and for several years afterwards, there were, according to one American colonel, “hundreds of prisoner

Reports such as these were so common, the American intelligence community in the early 1950s

gave high priority to the collection of information on Americans held in the Soviet Union and behind the

“Iron Curtain”. By the mid-1950s a high level Inter-Agency Committee on Americans Held in the

Communist Countries was founded.

The U.S. Government took these reports seriously. Indeed, John Foster Dulles, then U.S.

Secretary of State, instructed the American ambassador in Moscow to present the Soviet Foreign

Ministry an Aide-Memoire that said in part, “The United States Government has recently received

reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea

Soviet Technology Demands and Central Policy Direction

the Gap - 40 Years, 1952-1992” and video tape interview of LTC Corso conducted with Task Force

Russia on 23 February 1993.

The third type of information documents the Soviet demand for foreign technology and

expertise. In the late 1940s through the 1950s, the Soviet Union saw itself in a desperate race to

develop its scientific/technological base. The Soviet leaders placed a great deal of emphasis on

many of its best young minds in the Second World War, it was woefully short of scientists.

Consequently, General Colonel Serov, then a senior NKVD official, ordered Soviet intelligence

personnel to develop lists of German scientists who “worked in the past at design offices and research

Not long afterwards, the NKVD began kidnapping German scientists and sending them to the

scientists suggests the need for other Westerners with technological knowledge.

Closely related to documents that demonstrate the Soviet Union’s acute need for technology are

documents that provide insight into the thinking of the senior Soviet leadership. A document that

records the minutes of a meeting between Joseph Stalin and Cho En-Lai is the most revealing.

Stalin: “Concerning the proposal that both sides temporarily withhold twenty percent of the

prisoners of war and that they return all of the remaining prisoners of war - the Soviet delegation will not

touch this proposal and it remains in the reserve for Mao Tse-Tung.”

This exchange clearly indicates that the Soviets and Chinese actively discussed the idea of holding back

POWs.

1954

(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994)

drove up to some house got off the truck. A German and his wife were inside the house. We offered

him a paper saying that he wants to go to the USSR of his own free will, which he must sign...The

officer, Melnik, was holding a pistol. The German trembles and signs. That is the way specialists

were taken to our country.” from Irina Shcherbakova, “NKVD Hostage” in The Moscow News,

No. 35, 27 August 1993.

As has already been discussed, these three disparate types of information do not prove that

American POWs were taken to the Soviet Union. However, when taken together and viewed as a

whole, the information strongly suggests that the probability is high that transfers took place. But this still

begs the key question, if the transfers took place, how many American POWs were sent to the Soviet

Union?

Transfer of Only Thirty to Forty POWs: General Lobov’s statement to a Russian journalist that

possibly only thirty to forty Americans POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union seems compelling to

the U.S. side. It seems unlikely to the U.S. side that thousands or hundred were transferred.

This assessment is based first on statements by people who would have been knowledgeable of

the transfer. Second, it is based on a macro-analysis of the number of missing Americans.

Also a former high ranking KGB official told a U.S. Government contractor during an unofficial

The information provided by these two men is buttressed by an analysis conducted by an U.S.

government contractor who analyzed a list of 8,140 Americans missing in action from the Korean

cases. When a serviceman is listed as missing in action - body not recovered, it does not necessarily

mean that the serviceman in question survived. Friends and comrades may have seen him fall and

perhaps even buried him in a hasty grave. But because no remains were ever returned, the serviceman

was listed as MIA-BNR.

Consequently, when he examined all 8,100 cases of American MIAs, he was able to eliminate

5,945 cases as BNR cases rather than true missing in action cases, leaving by his conclusion 2,195

cases of soldiers missing in action - body not recovered who theoretically could have gone to the Soviet

Union. And no doubt, this number would be significantly smaller if one takes into consideration the

Corporation, National Defense Institute, 1944), p 183; the high level KGB source requested

anonymity.

145

lethality of the battlefield, if not Korean War era POW camps. Bombs and artillery exploding near a

person cause the virtual disintegration of a soldier. Few if any distinguishable body parts can be found.

As for POW camps, men died by the hundreds, victims of exposure, malnutrition, sickness, and by

North Korean hands during so-called death marches to, and between, POW camps.

It is not possible to say with precision what proportion or percentage of the 2,195 missing are

victims of catastrophic aircraft crashes or the nearby explosion of an artillery shell. But to the degree

that recent conflicts are an indicator, the number is high.

The statements by General Lobov and the senior KGB official together with a macroassessment

of the number of Americans missing in action, strongly suggest that the number of Americans

possibly sent to the Soviet Union is small, between thirty and forty. Moreover, those taken most

probably were chosen for the technical expertise.

A more detailed discussion of the information passed on by various Russian citizens is provided

in the following appendices. Also included in these appendices is a discussion of 262 interrogations of

Americans supposedly conducted under the auspices of the Soviets as well as a discussion of the role of

the Soviet security services with American POWs.

146

Appendix A: Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko

Appendix B: General Lieutenant Georgi Ageyevich Lobov

Appendix C: Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov

Appendix D: Colonel Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii

Appendix E: Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky

Appendix F: Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak

Appendix G: Unraveling the Mystery of the 262 Interrogations

Appendix: H: The Soviet Security Services and American POWs

147

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko is a sixty-seven year old pensioner and former Soviet Army

sergeant. In the early 1950s when he was still in the Soviet Army, he served as an aircraft mechanic for

Although the Division was based at Manziva, Chernigovka, Sergeant Trotsenko was assigned to an air

base near the village of Starosysoyevka. While not a paratrooper as such, Sergeant Trotsenko made

airborne jumps.

In November 1951, while on a training exercise, Sergeant Trotsenko injured his leg. He was

sent to Hospital 404 in the town of Novosysoyevka in the Primorskiy Krai. Novosysoyevka is a small

village located near the city of Arsenyev. Hospital 404 was not an ordinary hospital. It provided above

Hospital 404, according to Vladimir Trotsenko, was a very old rectangular building made of red

brick. Other witnesses later clarified his recollection confirming that the red brick building had existed

on the hospital grounds at the time of Trotsenko’s hospitalization. This building was razed some time

later. He felt certain that it was constructed prior to the Revolution of 1917. Vladimir Aleksandrovich

remembered the hospital as set in a wooded area. Nearby the hospital were the railroad tracks to

Arsenyev.

Because there was a shortage of space, Sergeant Trotsenko was provided with a bed in the

corridor on the second floor of the hospital. (Initially Vladimir Trotsenko said the medical ward was on

the second floor, but he later changed this to the third floor). His bed was next to a room that contained

four Americans.

The Americans were kept in a room that was about 12 x 15 meters with a window on one end

and a door at the other end. The side walls were of solid construction and did not have a door or

window. However, the end with the door was really a lattice of metal bars.

with Vladimir Aleksandrovich Protsenko [Trotsenko]

148

Peering into the room, Sergeant Trotsenko could see five beds parallel to the walls. Just outside

of the door was a desk behind which a guard sat. There was little sense of urgency or security. The

guard was in reality a hospital staff member - an unarmed private detailed to watch the American flyers.

When the guard needed to visit the restroom or eat, he would turn toward Trotsenko, whose bed was

next to the room, and ask him “to keep an eye on the Americans”.

Sergeant Trotsenko could see four patients in the room. Patient Number 1 had some sort of

back injury. His left arm was in a plaster cast. In spite of his back injury, Patient Number 1 was

ambulatory and able to speak. His bed was closest to the wall.

Trotsenko described Patient Number 1 as between 22 and 27 years of age with light color hair,

blue eyes, and slender. He also had a noticeable limp. His height was approximately 1.68 to 1.7

meters.

Although unable to speak each other’s language, the American still managed to communicate.

Based on random words he recognized as well as gestures, Sergeant Trotsenko believes that the

Patient Number 2 was in the bed directly next to Patient Number 1. He was in a prone

position, on his back, unable to leave his bed. His arms were suspended in traction with padding on

each side of his body to keep him from rolling to the right or left.

Endowed with a dark complexion, dark but not black hair, dark eyes, and with a height of

about 1.70 meters, Patient Number 2 was heavy set with a weight of between 70 or 80 kg. He was

As for Patient Number 3, he was in the bed next to the wall while Patient Number 4 was in the

bed next to the window. Both Patients Number 3 and 4 had bandages on their faces. Patient Number

had two children.

Michael Groh and Scott Fellows.

149

3 was about 1.68 meters in height. He showed some signs of life by moving slightly. The face of Patient

Number 4 was burned and most of the time he was unconscious. He was approximately 1.72 m in

height.

There was a fifth American who Sergeant Trotsenko never saw. He had already died. One

day, when Sergeant Trotsenko was able to get around, a hospital worker took him out to the graveyard

near the hospital and showed him a grave where, the hospital orderly said, the American was buried.

Meanwhile, for the fifteen to twenty days he was in the hospital, Sergeant Trotsenko was able

to observe the activity of the Americans and those that visited them.

The flyers were given excellent care. For instance, they ate the same rations as the Soviet

patients. Moreover, the Americans were treated by one of the ablest doctors in the hospital - LTC

The Americans were also interrogated regularly by a lieutenant colonel and a captain. The

colonel wore an air force uniform, and he arrived in an “Opel” car, i.e. a car of foreign manufacture.

The captain also wore an air force uniform. During the interrogations, he served as the interrogator. He

arrived at the interrogations in a ¾ ton Dodge truck.

The captain evidently spoke English, and it was he who spoke to the four flyers. The lieutenant

colonel was about forty-five years old with medium to tall height - 1.72 meters.

The Americans were interrogated periodically while Trotsenko was in the hospital. The

interrogations generally did not last long and Trotsenko saw no evidence of coercion.

There is one incident, however, that is prominent in Trotsenko’s memory. On one occasion, the

colonel came into the room, he “approached the second bed where the burnt older man was lying, and

he pulled something out from under the sheet from around the neck of this patient. At first, I thought it

U.S. Navy at the time.

150

He pulled it out, looked at it, and then stuck it back under the sheet. He went around to all of the other

patients and did the same thing. He looked at the medallion on the neck of each patient. He did not

Not long after meeting the Americans and while still a patient in the hospital, a hospital worker

led Vladimir Trotsenko to a cemetery where the fifth American was buried. He remembers the hospital

cemetery was only 1.5 to 2 km away from the hospital. Moreover, as he entered the cemetery, the

ground rose in front of him. Trotsenko remembers this because he was still on crutches and had some

difficulty walking up an incline that ran almost the entire length of the cemetery. There was, he recalls, a

wooden fence, apparently constructed to keep out farm animals. The fence formed a corner with the

left side running a ways down the length of the cemetery and the end side extending to the right. The

grave was freshly dug in the far left corner with about 10 to 20 meters of clear ground before reaching

grave was fourth, from left to right, in a row of four graves side by side.

Is Trotsenko a Credible Witness?

The U.S. side of the Joint Commission has come to the conclusion that Trotsenko is a highly

credible witness. The Commission reached this conclusion after a thorough and exhaustive analysis of

Mr. Trotsenko’s testimony.

Mr. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko first came to the attention of the U.S. Russia -Joint

Commission on 24 March 1995. During a routine visit to Khabarovsk by TFR, Anatoly Follin,

Director of the American Business Center in Khabarovsk, passed to the U.S. that a former Soviet

Army sergeant claimed to have seen Americans in a military hospital.

POW/MIAs, Joint Session/Trotsenko testimony, 28 August 1995, Moscow, Russia

Cemetery, July 23 - August 2, 1995"

151

Vladimir Trotsenko called the American Consulate in Vladivostok after an advertisement in a

local Khabarovsk newspaper caught his eye. The U.S. placed the advertisement and asked the public

to come forward with any information on American servicemen who may have been sent to the Soviet

Union. Remembering his experiences forty-four years ago in the Novosysoyevka Hospital, Vladimir

Trotsenko came forward. Motivated, it appears, only by a sense of public duty.

The U.S. was eager to interview Mr. Trotsenko and did so on 14 May 1995 in his home - a

house that Trotsenko built himself and the very house where he raised two sons and a daughter.

Vladimir Trotsenko’s testimony was so compelling that two days later on 16 May 1995, U.S.

investigators visited the military hospital at Novosysoyevka. The visit only fueled more interest in Mr.

Trotsenko’s recollections. Consequently, on 20 May and again on 22 June 1995 Vladimir

Aleksandrovich was re-interviewed.

During the first visit of the U.S. to the Novosysoyevka Military Hospital, the commander, LTC

Evgeniy Nikolayevich Alsenshka, expressed some doubt about the accuracy of Vladimir Trotsenko’s

1. The Novosysoyevka Hospital while it is named Hospital Number 404 now was not so named in

1951 /1952.

2. He doubted that there had ever been lattice work or bars in the hospital since it was not a

psychiatric hospital.

3. The hospital was small and unimportant and would not have been used to treat American POWs.

4. There had never been a cemetery on the hospital grounds.

These apparent contradictions in Vladimir Trotsenko’s testimony were pause for some concern.

The U.S. decided to return to the hospital for further investigation. Two MVD officers, Colonel

1995, and the third, which included Mr. Trotsenko, on 26-27 July 1995. For details on the first visit

see R 051140Z Apr 95 Fm Amembassy Moscow, Subject: POW/MIA: Task Force Russia Trip to

Khabarovsk March 23-24, 1995"

152

Boltkov and LTC Aleksandr Mikhailovich, accompanied the U.S. during this second visit. They met

with LTC Viktor Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, the acting hospital commander. The three Russian officers

1. The Novosysoyevka Hospital was built in 1936, nearly two decades after the revolution and not

before the revolution as alleged by Trotsenko.

2. The hospital is “U” shaped and not a simple rectangle.

3. The hospital is not red bricked but plaster covered.

4. The cemetery used by the hospital is 4 to 5 km away with the next nearest cemetery 10-12 km from

the hospital.

The criticism leveled by the Russian officers generated concern to the U.S. Yet, they still found

Vladimir Trotsenko’s testimony compelling. Consequently, in an effort to “get to the bottom” of the

issue, the investigators decided to return to Novosysoyevka, but this time with Vladimir Trotsenko.

On Wednesday, 26 July 1995 after a forty-four year absence, Vladimir Trotsenko returned to

Novosysoyevka. The experience was a revelation to both the Russians and Americans. Indeed, it was

As the TFR team approached the hospital, Vladimir Trotsenko pointed to a spot and indicated

that the path to the cemetery was there. And, indeed, it was, although it was not visible from the road.

The path itself was overgrown and not in general use, but still clearly recognizable. Then in the company

of LTC Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilkov, a local MVD officer, Trotsenko walked along the path to the

cemetery - a distance of only about 2 km, not the 4 to 5 km the authorities described.

sent as e-mail message 12 July 1995.

Cemetery, July 23 - August 2, 1995

153

Two local residents accompanied them along the path to the cemetery. They confirmed that a

fence had once existed along the left side of the cemetery and running east to west. One long time

resident, Aleksei Yakovlevich Lazarenko, said not long after World War II he helped other villagers

build the fence in order to keep animals out the cemetery.

Based on Trotsenko’s earlier description, the grave of the alleged American and the four graves

next to it were in the northern part of the cemetery. Moreover, these four graves laid north to south and

not east to west as is the Russian Orthodox tradition. Once inside the boundaries of the cemetery, the

U.S. found an area in the northern section which matched Trotsenko’s recollections.

A long time resident of the area volunteered additional pertinent information. He stated that

soldiers who died while at the hospital, who had no relatives to claim the remains, were buried in

unmarked graves in the northern end of the cemetery. The area corresponded to where Trotsenko said

Next, the U.S. visited the hospital accompanied by a local policeman - Konstantin Mikhailovich

Maksimov. LTC Viktor Mikhailovich Aleksandrov, the hospital commander, was hostile and

argumentative. Once again, he pointed out that the hospital was stucco and not red brick. Also he

maintained that two large wings extending from the main building had always been a part of the hospital,

thus contradicting Trotsenko’s description.

This inconsistency was resolved during a later visit to the hospital grounds by the U.S., Colonel

Vasilkov, and Vladimir Trotsenko. During the visit, the group met Proskovya Fyoderovna who was

working in the hospital laundry. Fyoderovna, who had lived in Novosysoyevka since 1947 and had

worked in the hospital since 1957, stated that there had previously existed a red brick building on the

hospital grounds. This building was separate from the main hospital building and contained a

changes.

154

from Popov’s presence or whether she honestly changed her mind, is not clear. But even Popov’s

recollections do not contradict the fact that there may have been a barekamera on the hospital grounds

in the early 1950s. The barekamera that Popov worked at was not installed until 1956.

In addition to interviews with Fedorova and Popov, the U.S. team was given a guided tour of

the hospital. The U.S. investigators noticed several other interesting items:

· In places where the exterior stucco had fallen away, it was clear the building was made of red brick.

· The manner in which the exterior walls were joined, i.e. not interlaced and uneven suggests that

wings were added later.

The U.S. met with Mikhail Ivanovich Vasechko, a retired driver at the hospital. He started

work at the Novosysoyevka Hospital in 1942 and worked there until his retirement. He pointed out

that during World War II the hospital was called 307 Military Hospital, but after the war was changed

to 404 Military Hospital - the number that Trotsenko remembers it as.

Next, through the good graces of Colonel Vladimir Giorgiovich Raduzin, Deputy Chief of

Correctional Affairs, U.S. investigators were able to meet with Colonel Aleksandr Pavlovich

Lavrentsov, a KGB (now SVR) official who had been helpful to the U.S. in the past.

Novosysoyevka Cemetery, 23 - 26 October 1995

installed and operated a barekamera on the grounds of Military Hospital 404. According to Popov, the

barekamera he helped install - model SBK 48 - was placed in a wooden building and not a brick one.

Later when Proskovye Fyoderovna was re-interviewed in the presence of Vasily Popov, she agreed

that the barekamera was housed in a wooden building. When asked about her earlier testimony that it

was in a brick building, she said she must have been wrong because “Popov worked there and he

should know.” R 121104Z Apr 96 FM Amembassy Moscow

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While interviewing Colonel Lavrentsov, U.S. investigators mentioned that Trotsenko said that

the colonel who interrogated the Americans drove a German Opel. Colonel Lavrentsov responded that

after World War II many German cars were confiscated and distributed to MGB and MVD officers for

On 27 July 1995, the last day before returning to Moscow, the U.S. members, Vladimir

Trotsenko, and LTC Vasilkov returned to the cemetery for one last look. They came to a mutual

agreement that the most likely spot for the American’s grave is an unmarked grave in the northwest

corner of the cemetery, near where the old fence once stood and with three other graves that lay in a

north to south manner.

What Were The Results?

The trip to Novosysoyevka was revealing. Doubt about the veracity and accuracy of Vladimir

Trotsenko’s testimony disappeared. Even local Russian authorities who had viewed Trotsenko with

great skepticism seemed convinced as to the authenticity of his recollections.

As a result of this trip, the following became clear to all sides:

1. Trotsenko’s description of the cemetery with a wooden fence, a handful of graves lying north to

south, and a short path leading to the cemetery was confirmed.

2. The existence of a “red brick” building with a barekamera in which Trotsenko saw the four

Americans was confirmed on the fourth visit to the hospital grounds.

3. Trotsenko’s description of the hospital in 1951 as a three story, red brick, rectangular hospital was

confirmed.

4. Trotsenko’s recollection of the German “Opel” driven by one of the interrogators was confirmed.

Other aspects of Trotsenko’s testimony have been confirmed by other sources. For example,

Trotsenko recounted how a Soviet colonel, “...pulled something out from under the sheet from around

the neck of this patient...some kind of medallion - a round medallion.” Clearly this was a dog tag or

156

that American dog tags were rectangular. However, the U.S. Navy Artifacts Historian revealed that

from 1940 until approximately 1956, the U.S. Navy employed round dog tags.

Russian Response

On Monday, 28 August 1995, Vladimir Trotsenko addressed a general session of the U.S.-

Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs. His testimony was moving and convincing. The

Russians made no serious attempt to discredit Trotsenko. Colonel Semin from the National Archives of

the Ministry of Defense, however, did point out that a review of the admission records for Hospital 404

indicated that Sergeant Trotsenko was a patient there from 24 March to 4 May 1951 and not in the

October/November 1951 time frame.

Russian position when he publicly stated, “I agree with the remarks of Ambassador Toon that the

witness Vladimir Aleksandrovich Trotsenko is the first witness who displays a sufficient degree of

Subsequent Trips

In an effort to find the grave that reputedly contained the remains of the fifth American, the Joint

Commission sent a team of American and Russian investigators out to Novosysoyevka Cemetery for

the period 24 - 26 October 1995.

Working together, American and Russian soldiers commenced digging the first of three pits in

the Novosysoyevka Cemetery on 24 October. Despite the use of modern anthropological methods the

digging was slow and uneventful. Then, towards the end of the day in an effort to square off the left

corner of the pit, one American jumped into the pit. As his boots hit the ground of the pit, they made an

POW/MIA Affairs, 30 August 1995, Moscow, Russia

157

odd sound. The other soldiers noticed this and asked him to jump to the right side of the pit. It then

became apparent to everyone that the sounds were different. Something was under the dirt in the left

corner of the pit.

The next morning the excavation continued. It was soon apparent that the odd sound was

caused by a coffin under the dirt. Further digging uncovered a coffin, but it was not lying north-south as

expected, but east-west. The excavation continued in such a mannner that any graves oriented northsouth

Nevertheless, Russian and American forensic specialists opened the coffin. With respect and

care, they examined the remains. Based on an analysis of the overall condition of the teeth, it was clear

to both countries’ specialists that these were not the remains of an American. Moreover, the lay of the

grave substantiated the conclusion that this was not the area Trotsenko remembered.

The forensic specialists replaced the remains and decided to halt the operation for the present

time. Both the Russians and Americans agreed to seek additional information that would help any future

excavation teams to more precisely locate the graves described by Trotsenko.

Then a few months later, 17 March - 3 April 1996, the Joint Commission sent out another team

of Russian and American investigators. This time the team came with a ground radar set provided by

As a result of the efforts of the Joint Russian-American team using the ground radar, two graves

buried in a north-south configuration and a third grave which lay in an east-west configuration were

uncovered.

Of the two graves oriented north-south, according to the CILHI anthropologist on the scene,

one contained the remains of an Asian. These remains were returned to the grave. The second set was

identifying remains.

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identified as probably the remains of a Caucasian male. The teeth of this unidentified male did not match

the dental records of any of the missing crew members of a 6 November 1951 Navy P2V shot down

by the Soviets. Nevertheless, with Russian permission, a small bone sample was taken for possible

DNA testing. The remains were re-buried and their location carefully noted.

Although the remains of the American reputedly buried in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery could

not be located, the U.S. side of the Joint Commission still places much credibility in Vladimir

Trotsenko’s recollections. The focus of the U.S. side of the Commission has changed from trying to

find the one set of remains said to be in the Novosysoyevka Cemetery to a search for clues on the

names and fates of the four men seen alive in Military Hospital 404.

Conclusions

There are two conclusions that can be drawn from the testimony of Vladimir Trotsenko:

· Vladimir Trotsenko quite probably saw four American servicemen in the Novosysoyevka Hospital

in 1951.

· These four American servicemen did not return to U.S. military control.

While Trotsenko’s testimony requires verification, similar testimony from other witnesses

reinforces his credibility and the possibility that American servicemen were held in the Soviet Union

during the Korean War. The U.S. will continue to investigate these allegations.

159

China/North Korea during the Korean War. As such, General Lobov was the senior Soviet unit

commander in the Theater of Operations. Only Generals Krasovsky, Razuvaev, and Shtykov were

more senior.

Aviation Corps. It was an enormous command encompassing virtually all the Soviet troops engaged in

divisions but anti-aircraft and search light divisions as well. It reached its peak strength with 26,000

Given the political sensitivities surrounding Soviet involvement in the Korean War, the

Below is an extract of an interview conducted with Lobov. It contains that portion of the

interview where Lobov discusses the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. General

Lobov’s seniority, access, and unique command position gave him insight into virtually all aspects of the

war - military operations, intelligence operations, military-civilian relations, etc. Little went on in the

Korean theater of operations that Lobov was not aware of.

Unfortunately, General Lobov passed away a few years ago. However, before his death in

February 1992, he consented to an interview. The person who interviewed him is a native speaker of

Aviation Corps in Korea written by a Russian archival official.

120.

160

Russian and a Russian citizen - Igor Morozov. In 1995, Mr. Morozov provided by the U.S. with a

transcript of his interview with the General.

During the interview, the General discussed the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet

Union:

Question: Were not one-half of the (American) prisoners transferred to Soviet territory?

General Lobov: I don’t have any accurate information about POWs. But I can testify to the

following; I know that in summer 1952 at least 30-40 American POWs were placed in a

separate and closely guarded carriage, attached to a goods train, and sent to the USSR. The

most ‘valuable goods’ on this train was the American pilot of Russian origin Colonel Mahurin -

he was a wing commander in the USAF, and by Soviet standards a ‘wing’ amounts almost to a

division. I know that Mahurin agreed to work with our intelligence people, and he helped us a

lot. In particular, he explained details of the ‘Sabre’, which we were greatly interested in at the

time. We have to presume that the other 30-40 prisoners were also of some value to our

intelligence. They must have been a treasure-trove. I imagine that it was specifically from these

people that the GRU’s remarkable knowledge of our adversary came. If necessary, I could

request from Moscow information on any squadron and that information would be supplied

immediately. Furthermore, it was surprisingly detailed - right down to what brand of whisky the

commander of the squadron preferred, and even what sort of women he preferred - blondes or

brunettes. Incidentally, I know that it was accurate information of this sort, gathered from these

Americans held on Soviet territory, which in 1951 helped us seize a Sikorsky helicopter from

the Americans. This was something Moscow was extremely interested in at the time. You have

to guess that this helicopter helped our military-industrial complex greatly in producing our own

Soviet military helicopter.

That is what I know for certain. As regards the subsequent fate of those 30-40 Americans, I ,

like yourself, can only guess...”

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Given the political sensitivity of General Lobov’s statement, it is not surprising that controversy

surrounds this statement.

Igor Morozov, the Russian journalist who interviewed General Lobov, did not tape record nor

video tape the interview. Instead, he took detailed notes, and then went back to his office where he

wrote up the interview. Once he reconstructed the interview, he failed, however, to obtain Lobov’s

signature on the transcript verifying the accuracy and authenticity of the interview.

For several years the Lobov interview lay in Morozov’s files. Then in 1994, the prestigious

Russian newspaper Komsomolskaia Pravda published a long article by Igor Morozov on the Korean

the transcript of the Lobov interview. Indeed, the article follows in the same order the issues that

Lobov discussed in his interview. First, he describes the size of his command, then the number of

American aircraft shot down, next the merits of the MiG-15, the POWs issue, background political

issues, etc. Often quotes are taken directly from the transcript.

However, when the POW issue is addressed, the article departs from the Lobov transcript.

Rather than quoting directly that “at least 30-40 American POWs were ... sent to the USSR”, the article

takes a speculative turn. After noting the ability of the GRU to provide details on such matters as the

type of whiskey that American squadron commanders’ drank or their preference for blonde or brunette

women, the article suggests:

“Even if there would have been in the American Army on the Korean Peninsula hundreds of

intelligence agents at work (and it is agreed that there is little probability of this) - even then to

collect such detailed and exhaustive formation for us it would have been hardly possible. In

such a case there remains one plausible explanation as to how the Soviet GRU was so wellinformed

about the enemy - information this complete could only be received from tens or

hundreds of American POWs already on the territory of the Soviet Union. By the way, we

repeat - this is above all only a hypothesis which demands documentary evidence.”

1994, p. 4

162

This passage is very revealing for two reasons. First, the editors of the Komsomolskaia Pravda,

a respected newspaper not known for sensationalism or yellow-journalism, obviously found Morozov’s

interview of Lobov credible otherwise they would have rejected the article for publication.

Second, the Komsomolskaia Pravda article closely followed the form and content of the original

Morozov transcript of the interview. The only deviation from this pattern is when the article addresses

the POW/MIA issue. No doubt realizing the political sensitivity of the issue, the editors dropped

General Lobov’s statement “at least 30-40 American POWs were...sent to the USSR.” In its stead,

the editors replaced Lobov’s direct statement with a more speculative one, that perhaps “tens or

hundreds of American POWs (were) already on the territory of the Soviet Union.”

As a consequence of these two factors, the U.S. side of the KWWG believes that the interview

with General Lobov accurately reflects what the General knew to be the case, i.e. the Soviets indeed

sent some American POWs from Korea to the Soviet Union.

163

Colonel Gavril Ivanovich Korotkov is a retired senior Soviet military officer who, while serving

in the Soviet Far East, helped collect intelligence on the morale of U.S. servicemen.

In the first of several interviews with U.S. investigators, Colonel Korotkov related how he had

interrogated two American POWs in Khabarovsk during the Korean War. He also discussed the

system whereby American POWs would be screened in North Korea and selected for further

Colonel Korotkov retracted some of his earlier statements. However, the central core of his testimony

remains consistent, i.e. Americans were interrogated by Soviets and some were taken to the former

Soviet Union.

Gavril Korotkov is a soldier-scholar, a man who has dedicated much of his career to Far

Eastern issues. He has served as a staff member at the Institute U.S. and Canada, Institute of Military

History of the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, and is currently at the Ministry of Defense’s Scientific

Research Institute.

He was first introduced to Far Eastern affairs in 1950 upon his graduation from Institute of

Foreign Languages. As a young lieutenant, he was assigned to the Special Analytical Group of the

General Staff reporting to Marshall Rodion Yakovlovich Malinovskiy, then the Commander-in-Chief of

the Far Eastern Military District. Lieutenant Korotkov was a psychological warfare officer.

Lieutenant Korotkov’s responsibility at the time was analyzing the morale of American fighting

men. But such analysis required intelligence on the values, perceptions, and concerns of American

military men and such data was not readily available. Consequently, Korotkov and his colleagues were

eager to interrogate American POWs in order to learn first hand the answers to these vital questions.

Colonel Korotkov asserts that Soviet military specialists were given permission to conduct

interrogations of American POWs. However, these interrogations were conducted in a covert manner.

Colonel Korotkov

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The Soviet interrogator, for example, would wear a Chinese military uniform. The Soviets were

concerned that open, blatant interrogation of Americans would reveal the level of their involvement in

the Korean War.

While some interrogations of Americans by Soviet officials did take place, the Russians maintain

that such interrogations were prohibited. To stress this point, the Russian side of the commission has

produced several directives signed by senior Soviet officials expressly forbidding the interrogation of

Americans. Nonetheless, Colonel Korotkov remains firm in his statement that the Soviets routinely

conducted interrogations of Americans.

Korotkov described an interrogation system that resembles medical triage methods. The first

stage took place in North Korea. Newly captured Americans would be interrogated. There those

deemed of value due to their technical skills and knowledge would be tagged for further interrogation in

the Soviet Union. Second stage interrogations usually took place in the Soviet Union. Apparently,

during this stage, technical experts would question the Americans in an effort to obtain the most detailed

information possible.

Those Americans selected for interrogation in the Soviet Union would normally be sent to the

stage interrogations took place.

The NKVD, forerunner of the KGB, maintained control over the American POWs sent to the

Soviet Union. Generally the Soviet military interrogators had only a few hours with the Americans, but

on occasion they had several days in which to interrogate the POWs. After interrogation, the NKVD

would spirit them away to some unknown destination. From this point on, Gavril Korotkov had no

further knowledge of the fate of these American servicemen.

Korea, and the USSR].

165

Colonel Korotkov stated clearly in his first interview with the U.S. that he personally

interrogated two Americans in Khabarovsk. He can not remember precisely the names of the two men.

In a subsequent interview, Colonel Korotkov described the interrogation point as a

interrogated would already be there. He never saw any Korean or Chinese guards, just Soviet Border

Guards. Gavril Korotkov does remember seeing, however, one female North Korean interrogator at

the facility.

Once they completed the interrogation of a POW, a report would be written and sent on to Far

East Military District Headquarters. Another copy was also sent to Moscow and to the Main Political

Administration’s Seventh Directorate. The reports from the technical group were sent through GRU

channels to Moscow.

Based on the information he obtained from the interrogation of American POWs, Gavril

Korotkov wrote a Psychological Operation (PSYOP) study entitled “Morale of U.S. Service Men in

Korea”. This analytical work outlined the psychological vulnerabilities of American fighting men and

served as a guide to Soviet psychological warfare specialists in the field.

Visit From the Security Services

On 29 September 1992, several members from the U.S. side re-interviewed Colonel

Korotkov. The interview was held at the old Central Committee building - Ilyinka 12.

At the very start of the meeting for all to hear, Colonel Korotkov recounted a late night visit to

his apartment the night before. The visitor came to discuss Korotkov’s forthcoming testimony. What

was said is unknown, but he behaved in such a manner, Korotkov said, as to leave one with the

impression he was from the “special services”, a Russian euphemism for secret police.

166

Korotkov was raised under the old repressive Communist system which was characterized by

late night police visitations. Such a visit by a man who comported himself in the “old manner”, must

have been a source of concern.

By mention of this visit, Colonel Korotkov put the Commission on notice. Henceforth, his

subsequent testimony became tentative, contradictory, and more equivocal. For example, he now said

that American POWs were not held in Kharbarovsk, contradicting what he had said earlier. Rather, the

Americans were held in a mountainous area near where the borders of the Soviet Union, North Korea,

present. However, he suspected that it was in North Korea, or, perhaps, in an unclaimed zone. He

also now claimed that he had been in North Korea whereas earlier he said he had not.

Had Colonel Korotkov simply retracted his earlier statements or amended them consistently,

then his subsequent testimony would have been less troublesome, more understandable. But after

saying in September 1992 that no Americans were taken to Khabarovsk and implying that none were

sent to the Soviet Union, he contradicted himself eighteen months later. In another interview, Korotkov

stated, “Yes, I think I knew then and state now that part of these (American) POWs, a certain group of

Then less than a month later, Gavril Korotkov appeared before a plenary session of the U.S.-

Russia Joint Commission in Moscow. And he again changed the tenor of his testimony.

“In June 1950, I was sent to the Far East for service, to the headquarters of the military

district...You should know, that I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war...There were

rumors to the effect that prisoners, who could have been Americans, and who could have been

taken to the USSR, were captured. But I never saw them. These were just rumors...I can say

Colonel Gavril Korotkov

167

it again. I never saw Americans taken to the Soviet Union. I saw U.S. prisoners of war in

Then a month later, in an interview with a South Korean newspaper, Gavril Korotkov, again

reversing himself, is quoted as saying that many South Korean and American captives (from the Korean

War) were sent to POW camps in the Soviet Union and China, with many of the South Koreans going

Conclusions

The critics point to these contradictions in Korotkov’s testimony as evidence that he is an

unreliable and unstable witness. Furthermore, Korotkov can not provide documentary evidence to

support his earlier statements. Much of what he purports to know is based on hearsay.

Indeed, these are valid criticisms. It is, however, quite possible that many of the shifts in

testimony by Korotkov can be traced to real or imagined intimidation by authorities, especially when he

was requested to testify before official bodies. Nevertheless, Colonel Korotkov has stated and restated

when not in official venues that American POWs were transferred to the Soviet Union.

Seoul KOR

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In September 1993, U.S. team members visited the Kiev War Museum to take photographs of

captured American war equipment. While there, museum officials suggested they contact a Colonel

Derzskii, a World War II and Korean War veteran.

Consequently, on 17 September 1993, the U.S. interviewed Colonel Derzskii in his small Kiev

apartment. He revealed to the U.S. investigators that he helped arranged the transfer of American fliers

Colonel Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii is an old man now - born before the First World War in

December 1913. He had a long and distinguished military career.

Pavel Grigorevich Derzskii graduated from the Kiev Infantry School in 1934 and went on to

serve in the Soviet Army through World War II and the Korean War leaving military service only in

mid-1957. During the Second World War he served with Terenty Famich Shtykov - then a Soviet

general officer. Shtykov was a rising star in both military and party circles.

In 1950 Shtykov was both a general-colonel and ambassador to North Korea. More

importantly, he was Stalin’s trusted advisor and his eyes and ears in Korea. As Shtykov was Stalin’s

trusted advisor, Derzskii was Shtykov’s trusted advisor. Colonel Derzskii summarized his relationship

with General Shtykov as, “He trusted me completely. He didn’t trust anyone else. He felt he could

For reasons that still are not clear, whether it was Shtykov’s intervention or just the caprice of

Soviet military bureaucracy, Colonel Derzskii in early 1949 found himself and his family in a GRU villa

near Moscow - held virtually incommunicado. Then in March 1949, he received orders to report to

18 September 1993

169

settlement in China not far from the Korean border.

Division’s role in the attack on South Korea. It was an act that Derzskii considered shameful, but one

he executed nonetheless. Later, he encouraged an aide to provide a copy to U.N. officials in order to

unmask the Soviet Union’s dishonesty in the war. As a consequence, Colonel Derzskii was denied a

promotion to general and transferred to lesser duties.

In the course of several interviews with Colonel Derzskii, he made three points. First, he helped

arrange the transfer of a captured U.N. intelligence agent to the Soviet Union. Next, he said there was

a standing order to send all captured F-84 pilots, later changed to all pilots, to the Soviet Union. Third,

and finally, he said he helped arrange the transfer of General Dean, the captured commander of the U.S.

Colonel Derzskii was unable to provide many details on the U.N. intelligence agent other than

his name being Andreiko. Derzskii was not certain of the intelligence agent’s nationality , but believed

he was either British or American. Andreiko was captured in Seoul in June of 1950. Based on the

nature and number of documents found on Andreiko, the Soviets were convinced he was a “rezident”

or senior agent.

The NKVD, forerunner of the KGB, was deeply interested in Andreiko and ordered that he be

sent to the Soviet Union. Colonel Derzskii appointed another colonel - a political officer named Colonel

Nikolaev - to accompany Andreiko to the Korean/Soviet border. There, in Derzskii’s words, “He was

in Korea. In his first interview he gave the dates 1950 to 1951. In a second interview he said he

served in Korea from March 1949 to June 1951. When this apparent contradiction was pointed out to

him, Colonel Derzskii replied, "Yes. I wanted to be more accurate."

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In his several interviews with U.S. staffers, Colonel Derzskii noted that there were standing

orders to send captured pilots to the Soviet Union. Indeed, Derzskii made this point several times. On

each occasion, however, he varied the story somewhat. During his first interview, he said the GRU

ordered all captured F-84 pilots be brought to the Soviet Union. Later, he said the orders were to send

“all pilots”. This time, however, he attributed the order to the General Staff, but said it was General

Shtykov who told him personally of this directive.

In spite of the apparent contradictions in Derzskii’s recollections, much of it tracks with what is

already known, especially when viewed in a broader context. For example, at one point Derzskii said

that the GRU ordered that pilots be sent to the Soviet Union. Later he says the General Staff issued the

order. However, it is important to note that technically the GRU is part of the General Staff. It is the

intelligence support apparatus in direct support of the General Staff.

Colonel Derzskii originally said that all captured F-84 pilots were ordered sent to the Soviet

Union. He made this statement, however, in the broader context of a discussion of the GRU’s desire

to capture an intact F-84. At a later interview, he broadened the statement to include all pilots.

There is no doubt that during the Korean War the Soviets wanted to capture a high

performance American jet. It is, however, unlikely that they wanted a F-84 since it was a ground attack

aircraft rather than an high performance air superiority fighter. While modern, the technology of the F-

84s was not the most sophisticated. The Soviets wanted an F-86, then the top-of-the-line fighter in the

American inventory.

In an effort to capture an intact F-86, the Soviets formed a special group under LTG A.

Blagoveshchensky. Composed of test pilots and other elite pilots, the so-called Blagoveshchensky

were not successful.

p. 113.

171

family in China, he saw a plane make a forced landing in a rice paddy not far from the road on which he

was traveling. Initially, he thought it was a Soviet plane, but upon reaching the site, he realized that it

was an American aircraft. Derzskii immediately sent his interpreter to call Colonel General Shtykov

with the news. Then together with his driver, he helped the American pilot out of his aircraft and

The interpreter returned a short while later with instructions from General Shtykov. They were

to stand by and wait for a truck to transport the plane to place where it could be examined more safely.

Also, Soviet specialists from Andung would escort the pilot to an undetermined location. Later, a truck

showed up and took the aircraft and pilot away.

This aircraft was most likely the same F-86 taken to Moscow where Pavel Antonovich

Koval’skii and three other engineers at the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute disassembled the

aircraft. The key components of the F-86 were dispatched to the relevant engineering institutes so that

they could be studied in detail. Meanwhile, Pavel Koval’skii and his associates took apart the aircraft

The fact that Colonel Derzskii confuses an F-84 with an F-86 is the result of his advanced

years, lack of technical expertise, and the passage of more than four and a half decades. He is correct

on the central issue: the Soviets wanted to capture a high performance jet fighter in order to study its

advanced engineering capabilities.

1993 interview, he said it was "an F-84, this I remember." Then in early 1994 he said it was an F-86

because General Shtykov told him it was.

(Ret) Derzskii

1 June 1994

172

While the F-86 was clearly evacuated to the Soviet Union, the fate of the pilot is less certain.

When asked whether higher headquarters in the Soviet Far East ordered the pilot sent to the Soviet

Union, Colonel Derzskii replied, “Yes, (we were ordered) to send the pilot to China and to the Soviet

Union”.

Derzskii recounts that direct orders to “transfer American pilots to China for further travel to

Moscow” were conveyed to him by two very senior General Staff officers who had come to Korea to

review the military situation. One used the cover name Pavlov. In reality, he was General Pavlovskii,

future Chief of Operations of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. The other man used the cover name

of Matveyev, but in reality was Army General Matvey Vasilievich Zakharov, Deputy Chief of the

In the course of several interviews, Colonel Derzskii stated that he believed approximately 100

American were taken to China and another thirty or so taken to the Soviet Union. It should be noted,

however, in all of these events, Colonel Derzskii had “knowledge of” transfers of American POWs, but

he did not directly witness the events. As befits a senior officer, he directed subordinates such as

Colonel Nikolaev to actually conduct the transfers.

Colonel Derzskii is steadfast in his insistence that Major General William F. Dean, commander

General Dean was a distinguished and courageous American fighting man. He was captured early in the

war during the first desperate weeks of fighting when he went forward to set the example and to rally

Derskii, however, recounted his story from memory. He did not have access to notes. A scholar with

recent access to the archives revealed more details behind the surprise visit of the Soviet delegation to

Korea. See Alexander Mansourov, “Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China’s Decision to Enter the War Sept

16- Oct 15 1950, New Evidence From the Archives” from paper delivered to the Cold War History

Project, Washington, DC, 13 December 1995.

Sung in a recent interview stated that the North Koreans tried to convince General Dean to make

propaganda broadcasts against the UN, but he refused to do so.

173

state that he went to the Soviet Union.

Colonel Derzskii recounts his efforts to interrogate General Dean under the guise of a Red Star

reporter. But General Dean recognized Derzskii from an earlier pre-war encounter, and the

interrogation came to an abrupt end. A short time later General Shtykov told Derzskii to arrange for

General Dean’s transfer to the Soviet Union.

Derzskii, who was, no doubt, busy with affairs at the front, instructed Colonel Nikolaev to carry

out the transfer of General Dean. This is the same Colonel Nikolaev who arranged the transfer of the

intelligence agent Andreiko. Of course, Colonel Nikolaev complied with his orders. When he returned

from his mission, he described to Derzskii in some detail how the transfer of General Dean was actually

conducted.

According to Colonel Derzskii, Nikolaev escorted the General to a bridge that spanned the

Soviet/Chinese border. There he was met by several Soviet generals with vehicles. They took control

of General Dean and delivered him to a nearby airport for further transportation within the Soviet Union.

From this point on both Derzskii and Nikolaev washed their hands of General Dean.

Conclusions

Colonel Pavel Derzskii enjoyed a unique position during the Korean War. He was a senior

officer, entrusted with important state secrets. Moreover, he was a close advisor to Colonel General

Shtykov, then Ambassador to North Korea and de facto governor-general of the region.

As a consequence, Colonel Derzskii was informed of much that went on in North Korea. This

is especially true given that he was a close and trusted associate of the Soviet Ambassador - Colonel

General Shtykov. But also, as befits a senior officer, Colonel Derzskii instructed other, more junior

officers to carry out orders.

Consequently, much of what Colonel Derzskii related to U.S. investigators is “hearsay

evidence”. Moreover, it is possible to point to the lack of documentary evidence to support Derzskii’s

assertions. And, there are errors in the various months and dates that Colonel Derzskii cites.

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In spite of this, we find the testimony of Colonel Derzskii to be highly credible. This is not to

say that we accept all aspects of his testimony. We are reluctant, for example, to accept his

recollections on General Dean. Nevertheless, he is very convincing. Colonel Derzskii is not, for

instance, the only former Soviet military officer to come forward with recollections of transfers of

American POWs - at least three other retired Soviet officers have done so as well. Moreover, details

such as the capture of the F-86 - which he first related to U.S. investigators in 1993 - have since been

confirmed.

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Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kazersky is a veteran of the Second World War. He was awarded two

Orders of the Red Banner as well as numerous other decorations. In 1950, he was arrested on felony

In the fall of 1952 or spring of 1953, while serving time in the Zimka Camp, he had a single

encounter with an American pilot whose plane had been badly shot up over North Korea and forced to

land in the Soviet Union near Vladivostok. The American pilot told Kazersky that his plane had a crew

of three.

The Zimka Camp was an appropriate place to “hide” American POWs. Located in a desolate

portion of Siberia on the Veslyana River, it was far from civilization and other population points. It was

a work camp. And the American worked in the Consumer Goods Section making frames for

Nevertheless, Nikolai Kazersky had one fleeting opportunity to meet with the American pilot.

The pilot had been in isolation for a year or more and had learned little Russian, and Kazersky knew

little English. Yet they managed to communicate.

The pilot told him that there were two other crew members from the plane. His radioman had

been at Zimka with him, but the American pilot thought the radioman had been transferred to another

camp - named “Yaser”. As for the other crew member, the American pilot had no idea what fate had

befallen him. The American also told Kazersky that he was from California.

According to Nikolai Kazersky, the American pilot remained at the Zimka Camp for three to

six months and then was transferred to another, unknown camp.

death of Stalin.

Dmitriyevich Kazersky

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In spite of the passage of many years, Kazersky was able to provide a description of the

American pilot. He was about thirty years of age at the time. He was approximately 5’ 7” tall, slender,

with dark hair and complexion. Unlike most Soviets, he did not smoke. Kazersky remembers that the

American had a small oval scar on one of his cheeks. He was, Kazersky believes, of Southern

European ethnic extraction, possibly Greek or Italian.

Task Force Russia provided Nikolai Kazersky’s description of the American to the Air Force

Casualty Office. After a computer search, Air Force Casualty concluded LT Mooradian came the

closest to fitting the description for several reasons:

1. LT Mooradian’s shootdown date (23 October 1951) would place him in the time frame such that

he could have been sent to Zimka at the same time as Kazersky.

2. LT Mooradian fit the physical description to include a round scar on one cheek.

3. LT Mooradian was Armenian with the typical the dark hair and dark complexion associated with

that ethnic group.

4. LT Mooradian came from California.

There were only a few minor points that did not match with the information Kazersky provided

to TFR:

1. LT Mooradian aircraft was shot down over the Bay of Korea on the opposite side of the Korean

Peninsula from Vladivostok.

2. LT Mooradian was a bombardier and not a pilot.

3. LT Mooradian crew had thirteen members and not three.

On 17 December 1992, Nikolai Kazersky was shown sixteen photographs of American airmen

who had disappeared during the Korean War. After reviewing all the photos, Kazersky chose three

that he thought looked like the American he met in the gulag. LT Mooradian picture was among them.

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Conclusions

There are numerous people who claim to have seen American POWs in the Soviet gulag.

Nikolai Kazersky is one of those who said he saw Americans. The details of his description, moreover,

increase the plausibility of his testimony. Unfortunately, it is not possible to be certain that the man

Kazersky saw in the gulag was in fact LT Mooradian although his identification of LT Mooradian

Kazersky should have been shown more and varied photographs rather than being asked to choose

from a pool of only sixteen. The scientific validity of the identification would have been increased

significantly.

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Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak is a Moscow pensioner. An ethnic Korean, but of Soviet,

now Russian citizenship, Dr. Pak was drafted into the Soviet Army during World War II. In 1945 he

accompanied the Soviet Army into Manchuria and Korea. He then served in the Soviet occupation

forces in Korea until 1948. He was next ordered to demobilize and to become a North Korean citizen.

As a good communist, he followed orders.

While in Pyongyang, Valentin Pak became a trusted deputy to Kim Il Sung, the leader of North

Korea. He soon became First Deputy Foreign Minister, the second highest post in the North Korean

Foreign Ministry. During this time, he became privy to many of the secrets of the then nascent North

Korean government. And, indeed, Pak knew about or participated in many of the most important

policy decisions made in North Korea at the time.

Near the end of the Korean War, he left Pyongyang to serve as North Korean Ambassador to

Czechoslovakia and then to East Germany. He returned to Moscow in the early 1960s to attend the

Higher Party School. By that time, he had fallen out of favor with Kim Il Sung and he chose to remain

in Moscow.

Chinese foreign service officer named LU (NFI) that American POWs were sent through China to the

Soviet Union. In an earlier interview, he was less specific but did say he heard rumors during the

Korean War that the Chinese took their POWs to a camp in Mongolia and then sometimes the Chinese

did transfer some U.S. prisoners of war to the Soviets. The Soviets would then in turn exploit the

While this is hearsay information, what gives this unconfirmed testimony greater than normal

importance is that it comes from a former highly placed official in both the North Korean and Soviet

7 February 1996.

Dr. Valentin Konstantinovich Pak

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governments. For Valentin Pak was no mere functionary at the time, but a trusted aide and advisor to

President Kim Il Sung.

Obviously the testimony of one man is not sufficient to make the case that American POWs

were transferred to the Soviet Union. But when taken in the broader context, here is yet again another

person, and a senior figure as well, who has heard about or had knowledge of the transfer of U.S.

POWs to the Soviet Union.

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Corps, sent a long ciphered telegram to Moscow. Addressed to the Soviet Minister of Defense

Marshal of the Soviet Union N. A. Bulganin and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force Marshal

in the Korean War. It was a dry, detailed report written in Soviet bureaucratic style full of statistics and

facts.

Buried in this rather lengthy report was a brief, matter-of-fact statement, “During this period (the

Korean War), 262 American flyers, shot down in air battles or by anti-aircraft artillery, were taken

interrogation point was established so that tactical and technical information could be gleaned from

The message did not identify the location of the interrogation point, but did indicate that “the

the message, but the Soviets provided overall direction. And, of course, the Soviets received copies of

all the interrogation reports.

raised more questions then it answered. In late 1992, the Russian side provided the Americans with the

so-called “List of 59” along with interrogation reports. The List of 59 was supposedly a list of fifty-nine

American airmen who were interrogated during the Korean War. On closer analysis, the List of 59 was

fliers who were shot down in air battles over the territory of northern Korea and China in order to

obtain enemy operational tactics, radar sets, and radio information."

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really a list of 56. Two of the names on the list were duplicates and one of those listed was an

Australian. Moreover, when one examined the accompanying “interrogation reports”, it was clear that

only thirty were really full interrogation reports. Some of the reports were extracts from larger reports,

others were merely mentions of people seen, still others were short, simple one paragraph biographies,

and finally some were just lists of personal effects.

point, the key question therefore became - where are the remaining 206 interrogations?

held in Moscow, Russia, the U.S. side brought up this question directly. The Russian response to the

question was tentative and vague.

“Not all interrogations, or let’s say answers, were of great interest. Some, let’s say, that had the

most valuable information, or were from the most valuable pilots, these interrogations were

forwarded to higher headquarters. Regarding other pilots that didn’t have valuable information,

or were not themselves of great value, their interrogations were most likely retained at an

interrogation point. They might have been destroyed there and the only thing that was reported

to higher headquarters, was that such and such an individual, or pilot was interrogated, and they

Another Russian commissioner added,

“I am convinced that we are not going to find 262 interrogation reports. Why? Because I

summaries out of the interrogation reports, and the reports themselves were sent back to the

Koreans or Chinese. Brief summaries of the interrogation reports were forwarded up to

POW/MIA Affairs, 2 June 1994, Moscow, Russia, p. 33.

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another headquarters. Therefore, the interrogation reports that we have, are from 1952-1953,

While the Russians were no doubt sincere in explaining the absence of 206 interrogation

reports, their explanations are not entirely satisfying. For example, one of the Russian representatives

stressed that only “...the most valuable information, or [interrogations that] were from the most valuable

viewed these interrogations as important and surely they must have been forwarded to Moscow. While

the U.S. side can not say that these interrogations exist, it seems likely that they do. Moreover, it seems

probable that many of the two hundred or so other unaccounted for interrogations exist as well.

A further reason that the U.S. side of the Korean War Working Group is inclined to believe that

there are still some interrogation reports yet to be provided to the American side rests on an assessment

of the nature of Soviet bureaucratic culture. A hallmark characteristic of Soviet communist culture was

the demand that all collectives at least meet or better yet over fulfill the plan. Quantity rather than quality

counted. Even the military could not escape this emphasis on meeting quantitative goals.

mention its commander, were interested in producing the maximum number of interrogations and

forwarding them to GRU [military intelligence] headquarters in Moscow as well to Far East Military

District Headquarters in Khabarovsk.

Indeed, the fact that General Slyusarev was able to state with precision that 262 interrogations took

place is indicative of not only good record keeping but an interest in numbers and quantity.

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The interest of the U.S. side in the 206 unaccounted for interrogations derives from a

fundamental hypothesis. That is, if any Americans were sent to the Soviet Union, they were no doubt

first pre-screened. During this pre-screening process that probably took place in North Korea or

China, those judged of value to the Soviet Union would be pulled aside. And, of course, interrogations

were the basis of this pre-screening.

The American side considers the review of any extant interrogations of particular value. This is

not so that former American POWs can be prosecuted for providing aid and comfort to the enemy, but

rather because the reports may be an indicator of Soviet efforts to select out some American POWs for

transfer to the USSR.

Given the Soviet penchant for producing as many reports as possible as well as its emphasis on

record keeping, the U.S. side finds it difficult to accept that only 56 interrogations are available and that

206 still remain unaccounted for.

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In the nearly seventy-five years of the Soviet Union’s existence, the KGB, or MGB as it was

counter-intelligence, foreign intelligence collection, border security, signal intelligence, and the protection

In 1992 a retired Soviet colonel - Gavril Korotkov claimed that American POWs were taken to

the Soviet Union for interrogation. Colonel Korotkov recalled that while on the territory of the Soviet

Union the NKVD maintained control over the Americans. Soviet military interrogators were given only

a few hours with the Americans and then they were returned to NKVD control.

In part, because of Colonel Korotkov’s testimony, a working hypothesis by the American side

has been that the MGB and/or its subordinate organs played an important role in any transfer of

Americans to the Soviet Union and almost certainly had control over Americans on the territory of the

Central Committee and the Politburo, it did not report to or through the military chain of command.

Hence, directives from Moscow that military officials were to have no direct contact with American

POWs did not pertain to MGB officials.

In the course of conducting research over the last three years, the U.S. has found from time to

time indications of MGB activities. The evidence is not conclusive but it is highly suggestive. For

example, there is evidence that MGB organized the interrogation of American POWs as well as

participated in the interrogations. Unlike the military’s GRU intelligence department, the MGB does not

NKVD, MGB, MVD, and KGB. At the start of the Korean War, it was still known as the NKVD,

but by the end of the war it was called the MGB.

used because of the magnitude of all the responsibilities that fall to the MGB/KGB.

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seem to have faced a prohibition against contact with Americans. There are, moreover, strong

indications that the MGB had, and quite probably still has, interrogation reports in its possession.

Indicative of MGB involvement with American POWs is a long report sent to Moscow by

to Colonel General Malinin and Colonel General Batitskii and marked “urgent”, the message was a

was shot down over North Korea in the summer of 1952. The Soviets obviously placed great

“Representatives from the MGB USSR and China have arrived from Peking to conduct further

prisoner interrogations, to gain more precise information on spy centers, landing strips, and

incidents of overflights of the territory of the Soviet Union. The interrogation will be continued

in Pekton.”

“I consider it advisable as well to send specialists on other matters.”

“I request your instructions as to the procedures for sending you the materials and advisability of

our participation in the interrogations.”

At the very bottom of the document was a note penned by Colonel General Malinin that

contained instructions to organize immediately a supplementary interrogation of the Strieby crew.

This message indicates that the MGB was involved in the interrogation of American POWs.

Second, the statement, “I request your instructions... and advisability of our participation in the

interrogations” confirms that Soviet military officials were prohibited to interrogate American POWs

without permission. Yet, the statement “Representatives of the MGB USSR and China have arrived to

conduct further prisoner interrogations” clearly suggests that the MGB, which is not part of the military,

did not need permission to conduct interrogations of Americans.

There is yet another example where the MGB played a role in the interrogation of American POWs:

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“I am reporting that, according to the report of the MGB USSR advisor in China, 9 crew

Strategic Aviation, which was shot down in the An’dung region on 12 January 1953, were

taken prisoner...On the instructions of the TsK (Central Committee) of the Communist Party of

China, they will be sent to Peking and subject to interrogation.”

“The Minister of Public Safety of China, having reported on 27 January 1953 to our advisor on

this decision of the TsK KPK (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), requested

that our advisor help the Chinese investigators organize the interrogation of the prisoners of war

and check their work.”

The shoot down mentioned above refers to the so-called Arnold crew. Colonel John K.

aboard a B-29. On 12 January 1953 Colonel Arnold’s B-29 was on a PSYOP leaflet drop

when it was attacked at approximately 2245 hours by MiG-15s and radar controlled antiaircraft

fire. The aircraft was hit and crashed.

Eleven of the fourteen member crew were repatriated. The Chinese, who captured the crew

near Andung, China, sent them to Beijing for interrogation - an interrogation organized by the MGB.

Both of these reports clearly show that the MGB was active in the interrogation of American

POWs. Moreover, one of the documents (TFR 300-15/16) suggests that the MGB, unlike the Army,

was not restricted from establishing direct contact with American POWs. Furthermore, since the MGB

helped organize the interrogations, it seems probable that the Chinese would have given the Soviets at

least a courtesy copy of the interrogations.

There is in fact direct evidence that the MGB did receive at least some of the interrogations.

One of the documents provided to the U.S. side is titled “A List of Documents on the Testimonies of the

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interrogation of Colonel Arnold but not the interrogation of Captain Llewellyn or of A1C Kiba. The

U.S. received only short one paragraph biographies on each, but not interrogations.

Moreover, A1C Kiba, who returned to military control after the war, distinctly remembers

being interrogated by Russians, and Soviet records such as the one above clearly indicate they had

possession of Kiba’s interrogation. Furthermore, it seems quite likely that these and other interrogations

are still extent in the archives of the Russian security services.

In summation, a review of the evidence of MGB (KGB or security service) involvement with

American POWs is not conclusive. However, it is highly suggestive that the MGB was more deeply

involved with American POWs than previously recognized. While the MGB cannot be directly linked

with any transfers, it can be linked with interrogations. The MGB also appears to have had unfettered

access to prisoners. Finally, there is a high probability that the Russian security service archives still hold

interrogation reports on American POWs.