Korean War POW MIA Network

Ex-POWs

At the end of the Korean War, the communists released UN forces in two major events:

(from 50h Anniversary website)

Operation Little Switch, April 20–May 3, 1953, was the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of the Korean War. The exchange was agreed to during the truce talks at Panmunjom on April 11, following United Nations (U.N.) Commander in Chief General Mark W. Clark’s indirect approach to North Korean Premier Kim II Sung and Chinese General Peng Dehuai, which itself had developed from initiatives at the United Nations and the International Red Cross in Geneva. The Communist side repatriated 684 U.N. sick and wounded troops, while the U.N. Command (U.N.C.) returned 1,030 Chinese and 5,194 Koreans, together with 446 civilian internees. As with everything else concerning the prisoner of war (POW) issue, the exchange was marked by strong disagreement and controversy. Returning Communist prisoners tried to embarrass their captors by rejecting rations and clothing issued to them, while sensational reports appeared in the Western press alleging that numbers of sick and wounded POWs were still being held by the Communists in spite of the exchange agreements. The contentious issue that had prolonged the war for two years, that no U.N. POW would be forcibly repatriated, remained. The surprising acceptance of this exchange may well have come as a result of uncertainty over Soviet policies after the death of Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.

Operation Big Switch, August 5–December 23, 1953, was the final exchange of prisoners of war by both sides, and, like Little Switch, was marked by controversy over voluntary repatriation and, later, by allegations of brainwashing and torture of U.N. POWs by the Communists. The issue of forced repatriation of POWs proved the major stumbling block to successful conclusion of the truce talks. Communist insistence on the return of all captured nationals held by the U.N.C. was strenuously opposed by the U.S. and South Korean governments, although a number of the other governments who had committed forces to the U.N. command in Korea argued that the principle of voluntary repatriation should not be permitted to obstruct an early conclusion of hostilities. Eventually it was agreed that a U.N. Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (N.N.R.C.), chaired by India, would take responsibility for prisoners who had indicated a desire to remain with their captors. During a 90-day period in which the N.N.R.C. held custody of the “non-repatriates,” a series of “explanations” was provided during which the non-returnees were advised strongly to return to their home nations, generally without success.

MIA/CAP Report - At the end of the war, thousands of men returned from prison camps.

While aboard the ships crossing the Pacific, they were debriefed at least four times.  They were asked many questions about who they remember seeing or about whom they heard information . Each time, as they became stronger, their memory improved and recollections were recorded. 

Those debriefs were formulated into reports of the ”Missing in Action” in one column and the “Captured” in another. 

If a number appears in this MIA/CAP field when you click on a particular name, it means that number of “Captured” offered some information on the subject MIA.

The actual debriefs are on the sixth floor of the National Archives, but have not been released to the Public. According to researchers at DPMO, we’ve already spent a $Million of your tax dollars on their declassification, but the job is just to large to tackle without more money.

In the coming months, we hope to have the names of those ex-POWs (who mentioned the MIAs) on the page with the subject MIA.
Meanwhile. email us and we'll supply you the list.